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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are found to be vulnerable against adversarial examples,
which are carefully crafted inputs with a small magnitude of perturbation aiming to induce
arbitrarily incorrect predictions. Recent studies show that adversarial examples can pose
a threat to real-world security-critical applications: a “physically adversarial Stop Sign”
can be synthesized such that the autonomous driving cars will misrecognize it as others
(e.g., a speed limit sign). However, these image-based adversarial examples cannot easily
alter 3D scans such as widely equipped LiDAR or radar on autonomous vehicles. In
this paper, we reveal the potential vulnerabilities of LiDAR-based autonomous driving
detection systems, by proposing an optimization based approach LiDAR-Adv to generate
real-world adversarial objects that can evade the LiDAR-based detection systems under
various conditions. We first explore the vulnerabilities of LiDAR using an evolution-
based blackbox attack algorithm, and then propose a strong attack strategy, using our
gradient-based approach LiDAR-Adv. We test the generated adversarial objects on the
Baidu Apollo autonomous driving platform and show that such physical systems are indeed
vulnerable to the proposed attacks. We 3D-print our adversarial objects and perform
physical experiments with LiDAR equipped cars to illustrate the effectiveness of LiDAR-
Adv. Please find more visualizations and physical experimental results on this website:
https://sites.google.com/view/lidar-adv.
1 Introduction
Machine learning, especially deep neural networks (DNNs), have achieved great successes in various do-
mains, [5, 6, 9, 17]. Several safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles (AV) have also adopted
machine learning models and achieved promising performance. However, recent studies show that machine
learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [2, 8, 18, 20, 21, 23]. In these attacks, small perturbations
are sufficient to cause various well-trained models to output “adversarial" prediction. In this paper we aim to
explore similar vulnerabilities in today’s autonomous driving systems.
Such adversarial attacks have been largely explored in the image domain. In addition, to demonstrate such
attacks pose a threat in the real world, some studies propose to generate physical stickers or printable textures
that can confuse a classifier to recognize a stop sign [1, 7]. However, an autonomous driving system is not
merely an image-based classifier. For perception, most autonomous driving detection systems are equipped
with LiDAR (Light Detection And Ranging) or RADAR (Radio Detection and Ranging) devices which
are capable of directly probing the surrounding 3D environment with laser beams. This raises the doubt
of whether texture perturbation in previous work will affect LiDAR-scanned point clouds. In addition, the
LiDAR-based detection system consists of multiple non-differentiable steps, rather than a single end-to-end
network, which largely limits the use of gradient-based end-to-end attacks. These two key obstacles not only
invalidate previous image-based approaches, but also raise several new challenges when we want to construct
an adversarial object: 1) LiDAR-based detection system projects 3D shape to a point cloud using physical
LiDAR equipment. The point cloud is then fed into the machine learning detection system. Therefore, how
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shape perturbation affects the scanned point cloud is not clear. 2) The preprocessing of the LiDAR point
clouds is non-differentiable, preventing the naive use of gradient-based optimizers. 3) The perturbation space
is limited due to multiple aspects. First, we need to ensure the perturbed object can be reconstructed in the real
world. Second, a valid LiDAR scan of an object is a constrained subset of point cloud, making the perturbation
space much smaller compared to perturbing the point cloud without any constraint [19].
In this paper, we propose LiDAR-Adv to address the above issues and generate adversarial object against
real-world LiDAR system as shown in Figure 1. We first simulate a differentiable LiDAR renderer to bridge
the perturbations from 3D objects to LiDAR scans (or point cloud). Then we formulate 3D feature aggregation
with a differentiable proxy function. Finally, we devise different losses to ensure the smoothness of the
generated 3D adversarial objects. To better demonstrate the flexibility of the proposed attack approach, we
evaluate our attacking approach under two different attacking scenarios: 1) Hiding Object: synthesizing an
“adversarial object” that will not be detected by the detector. 2) Changing Label: synthesizing an “adversarial
object” that is recognized as a specified adversarial target by the detector. We also compare LiDAR-Adv with
the evolution algorithm in the blackbox setting.
To evaluate the real-world impact of LiDAR-Adv, we 3D print out the generated adversarial objects and test
them on the Baidu Apollo autonomous driving platform, an industry-level system which is not only highly
adopted for research purpose but also actively used in industries. We show that with 3D perception and
a production-level multi-stage detector, we are able to mislead the autonomous driving system to achieve
different adversarial targets.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows: (1) We propose LiDAR-Adv, an end-to-end approach to
generate physically plausible adversarial objects against LiDAR-based autonomous driving detection systems.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to exploit adversarial objects for such systems. (2)We
experiment on Apollo, an industry-level autonomous driving platform, to illustrate the effectiveness and
robustness of the attacks in practice. We also compare the objects generated by LiDAR-Adv with evolution
algorithm to show that LiDAR-Adv can provide smoother objects. (3) We conduct physical experiments by
3D-printing the optimized adversarial object and show that it can consistently mislead the LiDAR system
equipped in a moving car.
Figure 1: Overview of LiDAR-Adv. The first row shows that a normal box will be detected by the LiDAR-based
detection system; while the generated adversarial object with similar size in row 2 cannot be detected.
2 Related work
Image-space adversarial attacks Adversarial examples have been heavily explored in 2D image domains [3,
8, 13, 14, 21]. Various works [1, 7, 11] start to study robust physical adversarial examples. Evtimov et al.
[7] has created printable 2D stickers to attach to a stop sign and cause a detector to predict wrong labels.
Following this line, there are also works [12, 22] aiming to optimize the 3D shapes to show that even the
surface geometry itself can produce adversarial behaviors.
In this work, we exploit the object surfaces to generate adversarial objects, and one fundamental challenge
that differentiates our work from the previous ones is: the sensor in a LiDAR-based system directly probes
the 3D environment as the input, bypassing surface textures of the adversarial objects. This means we may
only rely on shape geometry to perform any attacks. On the other hand, compared to prior works that have
shown successes on attacking single models, it is worth noting that the victim model which we experiment on
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Figure 2: Overview of LiDAR-based detection on AV.
(Apollo), is not merely an end-to-end deep learning model but an industry-level autonomous driving platform
that consists of multiple non-differentiable parts.
Adversarial point clouds Xiang et al. [19] show a proof of concept, that models taking raw 3D point clouds
as input [15] can be vulnerable to adversarial point clouds. However, this approach is only evaluated with a
single digital model. It is not clear that the generated point clouds can form plausible 3D shape surfaces, or
it can be reconstructed through LiDAR scans. While in our approach, though the victim model takes point
clouds as input similarly, these point clouds have to satisfy extra constraints such as: all points have to be the
intersections of the laser beams and the object surfaces. We address this challenge by proposing a differentiable
renderer which simulates the reconstructed laser beams projecting onto object surfaces. As we will show later,
when the object moves, the point cloud changes in accordance with the laser hits, and how to enforce the
robustness against such LiDAR scans is non-trivial.
3 LiDAR-based Detection
In this section, we provide the details of the LiDAR-based detection system that are directly related to our
proposed adversarial attacks. Refer to the online repository2 for more details.
An overview of the system is shown in Fig. 2. First, a LiDAR sensor scans the 3D environment and obtains
a raw point cloud of the scene. Next, the point cloud goes through preprocessing, and is fed to a detection
model. Finally, post-processing is applied to the detection output to obtain the detection predictions.
LiDAR. A LiDAR sensor scans the surrounding environment and generates a point cloud of X ∈ Rn×4 with
3D coordinates (uX , vX , wX ) and intensity intX . First, a sensor fires off an array of laser beams consecutive
in horizontal and vertical directions. It then captures the light intensity reflecting back, and calculates the time
that photons have traveled along each beam (Time of Flight). The distance and the coordinate of the surface
points along the beam can be computed. These points then form a raw point cloud of the object surfaces in
the environment. LiDAR sensors are supposedly robust to object surface textures, as the Time of Flight is
not easily affected by texture change. Though it also detects the intensity of reflected lights, it is unclear how
adversarial algorithms designed for natural lighting in image space can be adapted to invisible laser beams used
as light sources. Therefore, image-based adversarial attacks may have limited effects on such LiDAR-based
detection system.
Preprocessing phase. The previous raw point cloud X goes through a preprocessing phase to form a feature
map of x ∈ RH×W×8 (see Sec. B). The raw point cloud X is first transformed and filtered based on a High
Definition Map (HDMap) to attain a ROI point cloud Xroi. This point cloud Xroi is then sliced into H ×W
vertical cells at (buXroic, bvXroic). This “hard” assignment of points into cells will introduce piecewise zero
gradients for counting and max w.r.t. the input. After slicing, in each cell, the information of the points are
aggregated to generate a feature of size 8 for this cell, including heights, intensity, point counts etc. (detailed
in Sec. B). This H ×W × 8 feature map x will then be fed into a machine learning model.
In this procedure, many operations (e.g. max height, count) introduce zero gradients due to the “hard”
assignment, so the end-to-end optimization-based attack algorithms are not directly applicable.
Machine learning model. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are used to process the H ×W × 8 feature map,
and then output the metrics for each one of the H ×W cells. The metrics are listed in Sec. B.
Post-processing phase. The post-processing phase aggregates previous outputs from the machine learning
model and recognizes the detected objects. The Post-processing can be roughly divided into 3 major sequential
components: clustering, box building and tracking. The clustering process composes obstacle candidates
2https://github.com/ApolloAuto/apollo/tree/r2.0.0/docs
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using both the model output metrics and ROI point cloud Xroi generated from the preprocessing phase. In
the clustering process, cells with higher objectness confidence (greater than 0.5 by default) are used for
constructing clusters by building a connected graph using center offset. The obstacle candidates are produced
by selecting the clusters with two constraints: (1) the average confidence of cells in the cluster needs to be
greater than 0.1 (2) the number of points in the ROI point cloud that are assigned to the cluster is greater than
3. The class probabilities of the obstacle candidate are calculated by summing up class probabilities of all cells
in the cluster. The box builder then reconstructs the bounding boxes including the height, width, length of the
obstacle candidates from the point cloud assigned to the candidate. Finally, the tracker integrates multiple
frames of processed results to generate tracked objects as the output of the LiDAR-based detection, together
with additional information such as object id, speed etc.
Note that in this paper, we only consider a single frame for the adversarial attacks as a demonstration of
feasibility. For the case of multiple frames, it can be treated as enhancing robustness against object motions,
and such robustness against different locations is shown in later experiments (§ 5.4).
4 Generating Adversarial Object Against LiDAR-based Detection
In this section, we will formulate the problem first and describe the adversarial goals and challenges. We then
describe our whitebox method LiDAR-Adv which aims to tackle the challenges and fulfill diverse adversarial
goals. Finally, we propose an evolution-based attack method for blackbox settings.
4.1 Methodology overview
Given a 3D object S in a scene, as stated in the background, after the scene is scanned by a LiDAR sensor,
a point cloud X is then generated based on S so that X = render(S, background) For preprocessing, this
point cloud X is sliced and aggregated to generate x, which is a H ×W × 8 feature vector, and we call this
aggregation process as Φ: x = Φ(X). Then a machine learning model M maps this 2D feature x ∈ RH×W×8
to O = M(x), where O ∈ RH×W×7 (see Sec. B for concrete output meanings). O is then post-processed
by a clustering process Ψ to generate the confidence yconf and label ylabel of detected obstacles so that
(yconf , ylabel) = Ψ(O) An adversarial attacker aims to manipulate the object S to achieve the adversarial
goals. Here we define two types of adversarial goals: 1) Hiding object: Hide an existing object S by
manipulating S; 2) Changing label: Change the label y of the detected object S to a specified target y′.
To achieve the above adversarial goals in LiDAR-based detection is non-trivial, and there are the following
challenges: 1) Multiple pre/post-processing stages. Unlike the adversarial attacks on traditional image-space
against machine learning tasks such as classification and object detection, the LiDAR-based detection here
is not a single end-to-end learning model, It consists of the differentiable learning model M and several
non-differentiable parts including preprocessing and post-processing. Thus, the direct gradient based attacks
are not directly applicable. 2) Manipulation constraints. Instead of directly manipulating the point cloud
X as in [19], we manipulate the 3D shape of S given the limitation of LiDAR. The points in X are the
intersections of laser beams and object surfaces and cannot move freely, so the perturbations on each point
may affect each other. Keeping the shape plausible and smooth adds additional constraints [22]. 3) Limited
Manipulation Space. Consider the practical size of the object versus the size of the scene that is processed by
LiDAR, the 3D manipulation space is rather small (< 2% in our experiments), as shown in Fig. 1.
Given the above challenges, we design an end-to-end attacking pipeline. In order to facilitate gradient-based
algorithms, we implement an approximated differentiable renderer R , which simulates the functionality of
LiDAR, to intersect a set of predefined rays with the 3D object surface (S) consisting of vertices V and faces
W . The points at the intersections form the raw point cloud X . After preprocessing, the point cloud is then
fed to a preprocessing function Φ to generate the feature map x = Φ(X). The feature map x is then taken as
input for a machine learning model M to obtain the output metrics O = M(x).
The whole progress can be symbolized as F (S) = M(Φ(R(S))). Note that by differentiating the renderer
R, the whole process F (∗) = M(Φ(R(∗))) is differentiable w.r.t. S. In this way, we can manipulate S to
generate adversarial Sadv via our designed objective function operating on the final output F (S).
4.2 Approximate differentiable renderer
LiDAR simulation The renderer R simulates the physics of a LiDAR sensor that probes the objects in the
scene by casting laser beams. The renderer first takes a mesh S as input, and compute the intersections of a
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set of predefined ray directions to the meshes in the scene to generate point cloud X . After depth testing, the
distance along each beam is then captured, representing the surface point of a mesh that it first encounters,
as if a LiDAR system receives a reflection from an object surface. Knowing ray directions of the beams, the
exact positions of the intersection points can be inferred from the distance, in the form of point clouds X .
Real background from a road scene We render our synthetic object onto a realistically captured point
cloud. First, we obtain the 3D scan of a road scene, using the LiDAR sensor Riegl VMX-1HA mounted on a
car. Then, we obtain the laser beam directions by computing the normalized vectors from the origin (LiDAR)
pointing to the scanned points. This fixed set of ray directions are then used for rendering our synthetic objects
throughout the paper. Note that we can also manually set ray directions given sensor specifications, but it will
be less real, because it may not model the noises and fluctuations that occur in a real LiDAR sensor.
Hybrid rendering of synthetic objects onto a realistic background Given the ray directions reconstructed
from the background point cloud, a subset will intersect with the object, forming the point cloud for the object
of interest. The corresponding background points are then removed since these background points are occluded
by the foreground object. In this way, we obtain a semi-real synthetic point cloud scene: the background
points come from the captured real data; the foreground points are physically accurate simulated based on the
collected real data.
4.3 Differentiable proxy function for feature aggregation
As in Section 3, in the preprocessing of Apollo, it aggregates the point cloud into hardcoded 2D features, in-
cluding count, max height, mean height, intensity and non-empty. These operations are non-differentiable.
In order to apply end-to-end optimizers to for our synthetic object S, we need to flow the gradient through the
feature aggregation step, with the help of our proxy functions.
Given a point cloud X with coordinate (uX , vX , wX), and we hope to count the number of points falling into
the cells of a 3D grid G ∈ RH×W×P . For a point Xi with location(uXi , vXi , wXi), we increase the count of
8 cells: the centers of these 8 cells form a cube, and the point Xi is inside this cube. Specifically, we increase
the count of 8 cells using trilinear weights:
G(ui, vi, wi) =
∑
p
(1− d(up, uXi)) · (1− d(vp, wXi)) · (1− d(wp, wXi)), (1)
where p ∈ N (uXi , vXi , wXi) are the indices of the 8-pixel neighbors at location (uXi , vXi , wXi) and d(·, ·)
represents the L1 distance. The count feature xcount is the value Gp = G(ui, vi, wi) computed for each grid
i. Note that this feature is no longer an integer and can have non-zero gradients w.r.t. the point coordinates.
We then use this “soft count” feature to further compute “mean height” and “max height” features. For
simplicity, we first define a constant height matrix T ∈ RH,W,P , where T (., ., p) = p, p ∈ {1...P}. This
matrix stores the height of each cell. Next, we can formulate the mean height xmean−height and max height
xmax−height using soft count G:
xmean−height = ·
∑
p∈P Gp ◦ Tp∑
p∈P Gp + 
and xmax−height = max
p
sign (G(., ., p)) ◦ T (., ., p) (2)
where  = 1e−7 to prevent zero denominators. Note that the sign function is non-differentiable, so we
approximate the gradient using sign(G) = G during back propagation. The feature intensity has the similar
formulation of height so we omit them here. The feature non-empty is formulated as xnon−empty = sign(G).
We denote the above trilinear approximator as Φ′, in constrast to the original non-differentiable preprocessing
step Φ. A visualization of output of our Φ′(X)count compared to the original Φ(X)count is shown in Sec. C.
Since our approximation introduces differences in counting, Φ′(X) is not strictly equal to Φ(X), resulting in
different obj values of the final model prediction. We observe that this difference will raise new challenges to
transfer the adversarial object generated based on Φ′ to Φ. To solve this problem, we reduce the difference
between Φ′ and Φ, by replacing the L1 distance d in Eq. 1 with d(u1, u2) = 0.5 + 0.5 · tanh(µ · (u1−u2−1))
where µ = 20. We name this approximation “tanh approximator” and denote it Φ′′. We observe that the input
difference between Φ′′ and the original Φ is largely reduced compared to Φ′, allowing for smaller errors of the
model predictions and better transferability. To extend our approximator and further reduce the gap betweer Φ′′
and Φ, we interpolate the distance: d(u1, u2) = α ·(0.5+0.5 ·tanh(5µ ·(u1−u2−1)))+(1−α) ·(u1−bu2c),
where α is a hyper-parameter balancing the accuracy of approximation and the availability of gradients.
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4.4 Objective functions
Our objective is to generate a synthetic adversarial object Sadv from an original object S by perturbing its
vertices, such that the LiDAR-based detection model will make incorrect predictions. We first optimize Sadv
against the semi-real simulator detection model M .
L(Sadv) = Ladv(Sadv,M) + λLr(Sadv;S) (3)
The objective function L consists of two losses. Ladv is the adversarial loss to achieve the target goals while
the Lr is the distance loss to keep the properties of the “realistic" adversarial 3D object Sadv. We optimize the
objective function by manipulating the vertices. The distance loss is defined as follows:
Lr =
∑
vi∈V
∑
q∈N (vi)
‖∆vi −∆vq‖22 + β
∑
vi∈V
‖∆vi‖22, (4)
where ∆vi = vadvi − vi represents the displacement between the adversarial vertex vadvi and pristine vertex
vi. β is the hyperparameter balancing these two losses. The first losses [22] is a Laplacian loss preserving the
smoothness of the perterbation applied on the adversarial object Sadv . The second part is the L2 distance loss
to limit the magnitude of perturbation.
Objective: hide the inserted adversarial object As introduced in the background section, the existence of
the object highly depends on the “positiveness” metric. H(∗,M, S) denotes a function extracting ∗ metric
from the model M given an object S. A is the mask of the target object’s bounding box. Our adversarial loss
is represented as follows:
Ladv = H(pos,M, S) ∗ A (5)
Objective: changing label In order to change the predicted label of the object, it needs to increase the logits
of the target label and decrease the logits of the ground-truth label. Moreover, it also needs to preserve the
high positiveness. Based on this, our adversarial loss is written as
Ladv = (−H(cy′ ,M, S) +H((c)y,M, S) · A ∗H(pos,M, S) (6)
In order to ensure that adversarial behaviors still exist when the settings are slightly different, we create robust
adversarial objects that can perform successful attacks within a range of settings, such as different object
orientations, different positions to the LiDAR sensor etc. To achieve such goal, we sample a set of physical
transformations to optimize the loss expectation. In reality, we create a victim set D by rendering the object
S at different positions and orientations. Instead of optimizing an adversarial object S by attacking single
position and orientation, we generate an universal adversarial object S to attack all positions and orientations
in the victim set D.
4.5 Blackbox Attack
In reality, it is possible that the attackers do not have complete access to the internal model parameters, i.e. the
model is a black box. Therefore, in this subsection, we also develop an evolution-based approach to perform
blackbox attack.
In evolution, a set of individuals represent the solutions in the search space, and the fitness score defines
how good the individuals are. In our case, the individuals are mesh vertices of our adversarial object, and
the fitness score is −L(Sadv). We initialize m mesh vertices using the benign object S. For each iteration,
new population of n mesh vertices are generated by adding random perturbations, drawn from a Gaussian
distribution N (0, σ), to each mesh vertices in the old population. m mesh vertices with top fitness scores will
remain for the next iteration, while the others will be replaced. We iterate the process until we find a valid
solution or reach a maximum number of steps.
5 Experiments
In this section, we first expose the vulnerability of the LiDAR-based detection system via the evolution-based
blackbox algorithm by achieving the goal of “hiding object”, because missing obstacles can cause accidents
in real life. We then show the qualitative results and quantitative results of LiDAR-Adv under whitebox
settings. In addition, we also show that LiDAR-Adv can achieve other adversarial goals such as “changing
label”. Moreover, the point clouds are continuously captured in real life, so attacks in a single static frame
may not have much effect in real-world cases. Therefore, in our experiments, we generate a universal robust
adversarial object against a victim dataset which consists of different orientations and positions. We 3D-print
such universal adversarial object and conduct the real-world drive-by experiments, to show that they indeed
can pose a threat on road.
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5.1 Experimental setup
We conduct the evaluation on the perception module of Baidu Apollo Autonomous Driving platform (V2.0).
We initialize the adversarial object as a resampled 3D cube-shaped CAD model using MeshLab [4]. For
rendering, we implement a fully differential LiDAR simulator with predefined laser beam ray directions
extracted from a real scene captured by the Velodyne HDL-64E sensor, as stated in § 4.2. It has around 2000
angles in the azimuth angle and around 60 angles in the elevation angle. We use Adam optimizers [10], and
choose λ as 0.003 in Eq. 3 using binary search. For the evolution-based blackbox algorihtm , we choose
σ = 0.1, n = 500 and m = 5.
5.2 Vulnerability analysis
Here, we first show the existence of the vulnerability using our evolution-based blackbox attacks, with the
goal of “hiding object”. We generate adversarial objects in different size (50cm and 75cm in edge length). For
each object, we select 45 different position and orientation pairs for evaluation, and the results are shown in
Table 1. The results indicate that the LiDAR-based detection system is vulnerable. The visualization of the
adversarial object is shown in Figure 3(a) and (c).
5.3 LiDAR-Adv with different adversarial goals
(a) 50cm: Evo. (b) LiDAR-Adv (c) 75cm: Evo. (d) LiDAR-Adv
Figure 3: Adversarial meshes of different sizes can fool the detectors even with more LiDAR hits. We generate
the object with LiDAR-Adv and evolution-based method (Evo.).
After showing the vulnerability of the LiDAR-based detection system, here we focus on whitebox settings
to explore what a powerful adversary can do, since “the design of a system should not require secrecy” [16].
Therefore, we evaluate the effectiveness of our whitebox attack LiDAR-Adv with the goal of “hidding object”.
We also evaluate the feasibility of LiDAR-Adv to achieve another goal of “changing label”.
Table 1: Attack success rate of LiDAR-Adv and evolu-
tion based method under different settings.
Attacks Object size50cm 75cm
LiDAR-Adv 32/45 (71%) 23/45 (51%)
Evolution-based 28/45 (62%) 16/45 (36%)
Hiding object We follow the same settings as in
the above sections, and Table 1 shows the results. We
find that LiDAR-Adv can achieve 71% attack success
rate with size 50cm. The attack success rate is con-
sistently higher than the evolution-based blackbox
attacks. Figure 3 (b) and (c) show the visualizations
of the adversarial objects. We visually observe that
the adversarial objects generated by LiDAR-Adv are
smoother than that of evolution.
Changing label The result shown in Figure 4 indi-
cates that we can successfully change the label of the object. We also experiment with different initial shapes
and target labels. More details can be found in Sec. D.
5.4 LiDAR-Adv on generating robust physical adversarial objects
To ensure the generated LiDAR-Adv preserves adversarial behaviors under various physical conditions, we
optimize the object by sampling a set of physical transformations such as possible positions and orientations.
We show that the generated robust adversarial object is able to achieve the attack goal of hiding object with a
high success rate in Table 2. An interesting phenomenon is that some attack performance under the unseen
settings is even better than that within the controlled environment. This implies that our adversarial objects are
robust enough to generalize to unseen settings.
Furthermore, we evaluate the generated robust adversarial object in the physical world by 3D printing the
generated object. We collect the point cloud data using a Velodyne HDL-64E sensor with a real car driving by
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(a) 3D mesh
(Benign)
(b) Predictions (Benign)
(c) 3D Mesh
(Adv.)
(d) Predictions (Adv.)
Figure 4: The adversarial mesh generated by LiDAR-Adv is mis-detected as a “Pedestrian”.
Table 2: Attack success rates of LiDAR-Adv at different positions and orientations under both controlled and
unseen settings.
Controlled Setting Unseen Setting
Distance (cm) & Orientation (◦) Attack Distance (cm) Orientation (
◦)
0-50 50-100 0-5 0-10
{0,±50} × {0,±2.5,±5} 41/45 96/100 91/100 10/10 9/10
{0,±50} × {0,±2.5,±5} 43/45 96/100 90/100 8/10 10/10
and evaluate the collected traces on the LiDAR perceptual module of Baidu Apollo. As shown in Figure 5a,
we find that the adversarial object is not detected around the target position among all 36 different frames. To
compare, the box object (in Figure 5b) is detected in 12 frames among all 18 frames. The number of total
frames is different due to the different vehicle speed. More details can be found in Sec. D.
(a) Adversarial object (b) Benign object
Figure 5: Results of physical attack. Our 3D-printed robust adversarial object by LiDAR-Adv is not detected
by the LiDAR-based detection system in a moving car. Row 1 shows the point cloud data collected by LiDAR
sensor, and Row 2 presents the corresponding images captured by a dash camera.
6 Conclusion
We show that LiDAR-based detection systems for autonomous driving are vulnerable against adversarial attacks.
By integrating our proxy differentiable approximator, we are able to generate robust physical adversarial
objects. We show that the adversarial objects are able to attack the Baidu Apollo system at different positions
with various orientations. We also show LiDAR-Adv can generate much smoother object than evolution based
attack algorithm. Our findings raise great concerns about the security of LiDAR systems in AV, and we hope
this work will shed light on potential defense methods.
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A Differential Renderer
LiDAR Simulation The renderer simulates the physics of a LiDAR sensor that probes the objects in the
scene by casting laser Nray rays: R = {ri ∈ R3, ‖ri‖ = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , Nray}, with ri representing the
direction of the i-th ray. Given a shape S with the surface ∂S as input, the renderer computes the intersections
of rays R to the mesh faces in the scene. For each ray ri, the intersection coordinate Pi are computed through
depth testing (assuming the center of the rays is at origin, i.e. the reference frame of LiDAR):
pi = arg min
p
{‖p‖ | ∃t > 0,p = t · ri,p ∈ ∂S},
i = 1, 2, · · · , Nray
(7)
Object insertion Notice that we have a predefined set of rays R. To obtain these rays, one can refer to
the specifications of a LiDAR device. In our paper, we directly compute the directions from the captured
background point cloud P ′, so that the rays are close to real world cases:
ri =
p′i
‖p′i‖
(8)
With this, Eq. (7) becomes:
pi = arg min
p
{‖p‖ | p = p′i ∨ p = t · ri, t > 0,p ∈ ∂S},
i = 1, 2, · · · , Nray
(9)
This means when rays intersect with an object, the corresponding background points blocked by the above-
ground parts of the object are removed during depth testing; if the object is below the ground, the intersections
leave those corresponding background points intact also due to depth testing. In this way, we obtain a semi-real
synthetic point cloud scene: the background points come from the captured real data; the foreground points
are physically accurate simulations based on the captured real data.
B Background
B.1 LiDAR perception system
Detailed machine learning model input features and machine learning model output metrics are shown in
Table C and Table D.
Table C: Machine learning model input features extracted in the preprocessing phase.
Feature Description
Max height Maximum height of points in the cell.
Max intensity Intensity of the highest point in the cell.
Mean height Mean height of points in the cell.
Mean intensity Mean intensity of points in the cell.
Count Number of points in the cell.
Direction Angle of the cell’s center with respect to the origin.
Distance Distance between the cell’s center and the origin.
Non-empty Binary value indicating whether the cell is empty or occupied.
Table D: Output metrics of the segmentation model.
Metric Description
Center offset (off) Offset to predicted center of the cluster the cell belongs to.
Objectness (obj) The probability of a cell belonging to an obstacle.
Positiveness (pos) The confidence score of the detection.
Object height (hei) The predicted object height.
ith Class Probability (clsi) The probability of the cell being from class i (vehicle, pedestrian, etc.).
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(a) Φ′(X)count (b) Φ′(X)count - Φ(X)count (c) M(Φ′(X))obj (d) M(Φ′(X))obj - M(Φ(X))obj
(e) Φ′′(X)count (f) Φ′′(X)count - Φ(X)count (g) M(Φ′′(X))obj (h) M(Φ′′(X))obj-M(Φ(X))obj
Figure F: The performance of trilinear approximator and tanh approximator. The format “φ(·)′′count represents
the 2D count feature calculated by trilinear approximator Φ′; M(Φ′(X))obj represents visualization of the
“objectiveness ” metric in the output of model M using trilinear approximator with; Φ′(X)count - Φ(X)count
represents the approximator ’s error of Φ′. The same notation for tanh approximiator Φ′′
C Generating Adversarial Object Against LiDAR Perception
C.1 Gradient of proxy functions
Figure F visualizes the improvement of our tanh approximator Φ′′ compared to the trilinear approximator Φ′
in terms of the count feature and the objectness metric. Given object S, Φ′(X)a represents the aggregated
feature a of the point cloud X . M(Φ′(X))a represents the model output with respect to metric a. We observe
that our approximator Φ′ will introduce errors due to our approximation, which will finally leads to model
output difference. However, the error of the approximator has been largely decreased by using a more accurate
approximator Φ′′. This reduces the error in model output, as can be seen in Figure F.
D Additional results
D.1 Changing label
We conduct experiments with 3 pristine meshes (cuba, sphere, tetrahedron) and set the target label to the other
4 labels except for the original label. The results are shown in Table E, showing that our LiDAR-Adv has a high
chance to trick the detector to output target labels, regardless of different pristine meshes that it starts from.
Table E: The attack success rate of the adversarial objects generating using LiDAR-Adv, starting from different
types of pristine meshes. The target labels are the other four labels different from the original predictions.
Cube Sphere Tetrahedron Cylinder Overall
Attack Success Rate 75% 100% 75% 50% 75%
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Table F: Robust Adversarial Object against different angles. The original confidence is x. Our success rate is
100%. (Xrepresents no object detected)
Angle -10◦ -5◦ 0◦ 5◦ 10◦
Objectness
(Confid.)
Model X X X X X
Apollo X X X X X
D.1.1 LiDAR-Adv on generating robust physical adversarial objects
In this subsection, we add additional results to evaluate the robustness of the generated objects against different
positions and different angles. By doing so, it can provide insight on the performance of our adversarial object
in real-world settings, before we 3D-print the object.
(a) Benign frame (b) Adv (-10◦) (c) Adv (0◦) (d) Adv (10◦)
Figure G: The visualization of adversarial object with different angles. In the benign frame (a), the system is
able to detect the cube. When we replace the cube with our adversarial object, the system fails to detect the
object at all three angles. We visualize the mesh along with the point clouds in a close-up view in (b), (c) and
(d).
LiDAR-Adv against different angles We generate the adversarial objects by attacking for 9 angles simul-
taneously and evaluate the attack success rate among these angles. Our approach achieves 100% attack
success rate (Table F) both on our approximate model and the Apollo system. This indicates that our designed
differentiable proxy functions are accurate enough to transfer the adversarial behavior to Apollo. Figure G
shows qualitative results of the adversarial object from different close-up views. We can observe that the
adversarial example is smooth and can be easily reconstructed in the real-world.
Figure H: Our adversarial object can successfully attack the detection system, while placed at different
positions. The red spheres mark the locations we place the adversarial object.
LiDAR-Adv against different positions Similarly, we generate a single robust adversarial object against
different positions simultaneously, as is shown in Figure H. We select 9 positions and use our algorithm to
generate a universal robust adversarial example against different positions. Figure I shows 7 views of the
generated object from different angles, compared to the original object. This adversarial example is smooth
from all views. It shows that our approach is able to achieve the goal while keeping the shape plausible, so
we can easily print the obect to perform physical attack. Table G show the detailed results of our adversarial
object against these 9 positions: it can successfully attack the system among these 9 positions.
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Figure I: The optimized robust adversarial objects from 6 principal views and a particular view, compared with
the original pristine object.
Table G: Robust Adversarial Object against different positions. The original object can be detected by Apollo.
Our success rate is 100%. (Xrepresents no object detected)
Position Objectness (Confid.) Position Objectness (Confid.) Position Objectness (Confid.)Ours Apollo Ours Apollo Ours Apollo
(-50, -50) X X (0, -50) X X (50, -50) X X
(-50, 0) X X (0, 0 ) X X (50, -50) X X
(-50, 50) X X (0, 50) X X (50, 50) X X
D.2 Physical experiments
We 3D-print our robust adversarial object at 1:1, and drive a real car mounted with LiDAR and dashcams. The
adversarial object is put on the road, and a car drives by, collecting scanned point clouds and the reference
dashcam videos. For comparison, we also put the benign object, which is a box of same size at the same
location and follow the same protocol when collecting the point clouds.
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(a) the road where we perform the physical experiment (b) the benign object for comparison
(c) the car used to collect the dashcam videos and the point clouds (d) our adversarial object
Figure J: Our physical experiment setting. We 3D-print the generated adversarial object at 1:1, and drive a car
mounted with LiDAR and dashcams to collect the scanned point clouds and the reference videos.
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